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Recent  gyrations  in  the  price  of  gold  may  lead 
one  to  wonder  whether  economic  theory  has  any 
power  to  explain  gold  price  movements.  Some  ob- 
servers  believe  that  “the  ongoing  frenzy  in  the  gold 
market  may  be  only  an  illusion  of  crowds,  a  modern 
repetition  of  the  tulip-bulb  craze  or  the  South  Sea 
Bubble.”1  Has  gold  fever  infected  otherwise  rational 
individuals,  or  is  there  an  economic  rationale  behind 
this  behavior? 
Almost  daily  during  the  surge  in  the  price  of  gold 
in  late  September  and  early  October  1979,  for  in- 
stance,  the  financial  press  reported  frenetic  trading 
in  gold  and  other  precious  metals.  Typical  reactions 
of  gold  dealers  were:  “The  market  was  just  crazy 
and  wild”  and  “You  can’t  explain  it  by  talking  of 
inflation  and  such  things.  It’s  absolutely  insane.”2 
The  view  that  markets  occasionally  fall  prey  to 
speculative  manias  and  panics  has  long  been  accepted 
by  many  economists  who  regard  such  phenomena 
as  a potential  phase  of  market  behavior.  These  econ- 
omists  maintain  that  at  certain  times  mob  psychology 
may  dominate  the  market,  thereby  preempting  the 
role  of  economic  considerations  in  market  behavior. 
In  contrast  to  this  view  is  the  opposite  contention 
that  economic  theory,  relying  on  the  assumption  that 
market  participants  act  rationally,  is  sufficient  to 
explain  price  movements  in  speculative  markets. 
This  article  seeks  to  explain  changes  in  the  price  of 
gold  from  the  latter  point  of view.  Section  I  develops 
a  simple  model  of  gold  price  movements.  Section  II 
applies  the  theory  in  the  preceding  section  to  inter- 
preting  movements  in  the  price  of  gold  since  the 
simultaneous  legalization  of  private  ownership  of 
gold  in  the  United  States  and  beginning  of  gold 
futures  trading  in  1975.  Section  III  presents  em- 
pirical  evidence  to  support  the  contention  of  market 
rationality,  and  finally  Section  IV  offers  some  con- 
cluding  comments. 
* The  author  wishes  to  thank  Marvin  Goodfriend  for  his 
assistance  and  criticisms  in  the  preparation  of  this  article. 
1 Wall  Street  Journal,  26  September  1979,  p.  22. 
2  ,  19 September  1979, p.  3. 
I. 
ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS OF 
GOLD  PRICE MOVEMENTS 
To  begin,  it  is  useful  to  distinguish  between  gold 
stocks  and  flows.  The  stock  of  gold  is  the  quantity 
held  at  a  given  time,  whereas  the  net  flow  of  gold  is 
the  change  in  that  stock  during  a  particular  interval 
of  time.  Production  flows  add  to  stocks  as  newly 
mined  and  refined  gold  becomes  available  to  the 
market;  consumption  flows  deplete  stocks  as  gold  is 
put  to  uses  that  render  it  irrecoverable.  Gold’s  use 
in  electronics,  for  example,  depletes  stocks  of  gold, 
since  recycling  gold  is  frequently  uneconomical  in 
these  applications.  The  metal’s  use  in  art  also  de- 
pletes  stocks  because  once  incorporated  in  a  work  of 
art,  gold  is  no  longer  available  to  the  market.  Pre- 
sumably,  if  such  a  work  of  art  is  deemed  “priceless,” 
no  price  of gold  would  cause  the  work  to  be  scrapped 
and  the  gold  to  be  melted  down,  regardless  of  how 
high  the  price  might  be.  In  view  of these  distinctions, 
gold  stocks  should  be  understood  to  mean  readily 
marketable  stocks  at  a  particular  time. 
Owners  of  gold  stocks  have  the  choice  of  selling 
gold  today  or  storing  it  for  future  sale.  This  decision 
depends  on  current  and  anticipated  future  prices. 
The  storage  of  gold  yields  no  return  other  than  the 
prospect  of  an  appreciation  in  price.  The  assumption 
about  rational  behavior  implies  that  participants  in 
the  gold  market  act  to  maximize  anticipated  net  reve- 
nue  from  the  storage  of  gold.  They  store  a  quantity 
of  gold  such  that  the  anticipated  appreciation  in  the 
price  of  gold  equals  the  net  marginal  costs  of  storing 
gold. 
Net  marginal  costs  of  storage  are  implicit  storage 
costs  that  consist  of  the  following  components  :  (1) 
marginal  outlay  for  storage,  (2)  marginal  interest 
cost,  and  (3)  marginal  convenience  yield.  Marginal 
outlay  costs  comprise  the  charges  for  warehousing  (in 
vaults)  and  insuring  additional  stocks  of  gold.  The 
marginal  interest  cost  reflects  the  opportunity  cost  of 
owning  additional  stocks  of  noninterest-bearing  gold 
rather  than  alternative  interest-bearing  assets.  Fi- 
nally,  the  marginal  convenience  yield  is  the  monetary 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  3 value  imputed  to  holding  gold  stocks  for  commercial 
uses  which  require  gold  for  fabricating  goods.  The 
convenience  yield  accrues  from  avoiding  costly 
changes  in  the  production  schedule  and  the  associated 
frequent  spot  purchases  of  gold.  Additionally,  stocks 
of  gold  prevent  loss  of  sales  because  of  temporary 
shortages  of  gold  on  hand  for  fabrication.3 
Marginal  storage  costs  are  defined  above  as  net 
of  the  marginal  convenience  yield,  which  has  the 
opposite  sign  from  the  other  marginal  components. 
The  marginal  convenience  yield  is  a  decreasing  func- 
tion  of  stocks  held,  diminishing  to  zero  for  some 
sufficiently  large  level  of  stocks.  As  long  as  the 
marginal  convenience  yield  is  positive,  it  offsets  the 
other  marginal  costs  of  storage  to  some  degree. 
Equation  1  expresses  the  definition  of  net  marginal 
storage  costs  mathematically  : 
(1)  NMSC  =  mo  +  mi  -  mc. 
The  net  marginal  storage  costs,  NMSC,  are  the  sum 
of the  marginal  outlay,  mo,  and  the  marginal  interest 
cost,  mi,  minus  the  marginal  convenience  yield,  mc. 
The  equilibrium  relationship  between  anticipated 
gold  price  appreciation  and  net  marginal  storage 
costs  is  summarized  in  the  following  relationship: 
(2)  E(Pt+l)  -  Pt  =  NMSC. 
Equation  2  indicates  that  equilibrium  in  the  gold 
market  requires  the  difference  or  spread  between 
the  market’s  anticipated  price  of  gold  next  period, 
E(Pt+1),  and  the  current  price,  Pt,  to  equal  net 
marginal  storage  costs,  NMSC. 
The  aggregate  effect  of  individual  market  partici- 
pants  seeking  profits  assures  that  the  equilibrium 
condition  in  the  gold  market  holds.  A  geometric 
model  of  price  movements  will  help  illustrate  the 
relationship  between  the  price  spread  and.  net  mar- 
ginal  storage  costs.  For  this  exposition,  marginal 
outlay  and  convenience  yield  are  assumed  to  be  negli- 
gible  compared  to  the  marginal  interest  cost.  Under 
these  conditions,  if  the  interest  rate  is  r  percent,  then 
the  full  equilibrium  rate  of  gold  price  appreciation 
over  the  period  will  be  r  percent.  Such  an  equilib- 
rium  is  shown  in  Figure  1 for  a  gold  price  of  PO at 
the  beginning  of  the  period,  and  a  price  of  P1  at  the 
3This  discussion  of  storage  applies  to  any  storable  com- 
modity.  See  [2]  for  a  detailed  treatment  of  the  theory 
of  storage. 
end  of the  period,  where  the  percentage  price  appreci- 
ation  log  P1  -  log  PO is  r  percent.4 
Now  suppose  some  economic  or  political  disturb- 
ance  occurs  that  causes  market  participants  to  revise 
their  anticipations  of  price  appreciation  so  that  an 
incipient  excess  demand  (positive  or  negative)  de- 
velops  at  the  initial  price.  Market  participants  will 
try  to  profit  from  the  change  in  anticipations  and  in 
so  doing  will  bring  the  anticipated  price  spread  over 
the  period  back  into  equality  with  the  ‘interest  rate. 
Specifically,  suppose  the  anticipated  end  of  period 
gold  price  rises  from  P1  to  P1*  so  that  the  antici- 
pated  capital  gain  on  gold  over  the  period  momen- 
tarily  exceeds  r  percent.  Market  participants  will 
attempt  to  realize  profits  by  storing  gold  ;  but  since 
the  stock  of  gold  is  essentially  fixed,  they  will  only 
succeed  in  bidding  up  the  spot  price.  Equilibrium 
will  be  restored  at  a  new  spot  price  of  P0*,  where 
the  anticipated  capital  gain  has  been  brought  back 
to  r  percent. 
It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  anticipated  future 
price  does  not  completely  determine  the  spot  price. 
A  change  in  current  supply  conditions  could  affect 
the  spot  price  which  in  turn  would  cause  anticipated 
future  prices  to  be  revised  via  the  storage  adjustment 
process.  As  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next 
section,  individuals  may  choose  to  hold  more  wealth 
in  gold  than  in  other  assets  in  times  of  political  and 
economic  uncertainty  because  of  the  greater  security 
and  anonymity  of  gold.  Such  a  shift  in  the  composi- 
tion  of  wealth  might  be  made  without  regard  for  the 
4 The  reader  may  wonder  how  this  theory  of  gold  price 
movements  would  account  for  secularly  stable  gold 
prices.  In  this  situation,  the  anticipated  price  of  gold 
would  equal  the  current  price.  Individuals  would  be 
willing  to  hold  gold,  a  noninterest-bearing  asset,  only  if 
net  marginal  storage  costs  for  gold  were  zero.  This 
implies  that  the  marginal  convenience  yield  would  offset 
the  positive  marginal  interest  cost,  which  would  occur 
for  sufficiently  small  stocks  of  gold. 
log  P 
ONE PERIOD 
Figure  1 
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price  of  gold  would  be  bid  upward,  drawing  gold  out 
of  storage  for  sale  on  the  spot  market.  The  antici- 
pated  future  price  of  gold  would  also  rise,  since  the 
interest  rate would  otherwise  exceed  the  price  spread. 
The  preceding  theory  of  gold  price  movements  is 
readily  applied  to  gold  futures  markets.5  An  indi- 
vidual’s  decision  to  store  gold  for  future  sale  requires 
a prediction  of  the  gold  price.  Futures  trading  facili- 
tates  this  process  by  making  market  price  anticipa- 
tions  explicit  in  futures  prices.  According  to  the 
theory  of  gold  price  movements,  net  marginal  storage 
costs  should  influence  the  spread  between  futures 
prices. 
Chart  1  shows  the  percentage  spread  between  the 
prices  of  the  October  1980  and  the  December  1979 
futures  contracts  during  1979.6  From  January 
5A  futures  market  is  a  market  for  the  deferred  (future) 
delivery  of  a  commodity.  The  gold  futures  market 
broadens  the  time  frame  for  buying  and  selling  gold. 
Gold  may  be  bought  and  sold  for  immediate  delivery  in 
the  spot  market,  or it  may  be  bought  and  sold  today  for 
deferred  delivery  via  the  purchase  and  sale  of gold  futures 
contracts.  A  futures  contract  is  a  legally  binding  agree- 
ment  to  buy  or  sell  a  standardized  amount  of  a  com- 
modity  in  a  specified  future  period  at  a  specified  price. 
The  price  of  this  financial  instrument  is  determined  in  an 
open,  competitive  auction  on  the  trading  floor  of a futures 
exchange.  See  [3,  5]  for  detailed  discussions  of  futures 
markets. 
6 These  contracts  were  traded  on  the  Commodity  Ex- 
change  in  New  York. 
through  September  1979,  the  spread  fluctuated 
around  8  percent.  After  September,  the  spread 
widened  rapidly  and  varied  around  11  percent.  The 
greatest  increase  of  1.53  percentage  points  occurred 
between  the  observations  on  October  5,  1979  and 
October  12,  1979.  This  was  the  week  the  Federal 
Reserve  announced  a  more  restrictive  monetary 
policy.  The  associated  rise  in  short-term  interest 
rates  sharply  increased  the  opportunity  cost  of storing 
gold. 
In  the  particular  case  of  the  futures  contracts  in 
Chart  1, the  relevant  opportunity  cost  is  not  a directly 
observable  interest  rate.  Rather,  it  is  a  forward 
interest  rate  over  a  lo-month  period  beginning  in 
December  1979  given  implicitly  in  the  term  structure 
of  interest  rates.  The  forward  rate  implicit  in  the 
futures  price  spread  for  these  contracts  was  in  the 
neighborhood  of  10  percent  at  an  annual  rate  in 
the  months  before  the  October  6th  policy  change. 
The  implicit  forward  rate  increased  to  roughly  13 
percent  following  the  policy  change.  This  observa- 
tion  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  the  market  an- 
ticipated  persistently  higher  interest  rates  associated 
with  tighter  monetary  policy.  Consequently,  the 
spread  between  gold  futures  prices  increased  because 
of  the  higher  anticipated  net  marginal  storage  costs 
for  holding  gold. 
Chart  1 
Percent 
PERCENTAGE  SPREAD  BETWEEN 
THE  OCTOBER  1980  FUTURES  PRICE  AND  THE 
DECEMBER  1979  FUTURES  PRICE  DURING  1979 
(End  of  Week  Data) 
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INTERPRETING GOLD  PRICE MOVEMENTS  below. 
Gold  prices  change  over  the  course  of  time  be- 
cause  of  the  influence  of  disparate  economic  and 
political  forces  on  the  market.  Generally,  these 
influences  affect  the  gold  market  simultaneously, 
though  at  times  certain  factors  exert  a  greater  impact 
on  the  market  price  than  other  factors.  Chart  2 
shows  the  path  of the  gold  price  since  1975,  reflecting 
the  net  result  of  these  various  factors  on  the  price 
of  gold. 
This  section  examines  the  probable  causes  of  gold 
price  movements.  The  economic  and  political  forces 
that  affect  the  gold  market  fall  into  the  following 
basic  categories  :  ( 1) extreme  political  and  economic 
uncertainty,  (2)  flow  supply  and  demand  for  gold, 
(3)  inflation,  and  (4)  government  auction  policy. 
No  systematic  attempt  is  made  to  single  out  events 
that  may  have  affected  the  price  of  gold  in  particular 
instances  since  1975.  Rather,  each  factor  is  discussed 
separately  with  regard  to  its  probable  relative  im- 
portance  in  causing  price  movements. 
Stocks  of  gold  grow  only  very  slowly  because  in- 
creasing  stocks  requires  the  use  of  much  labor,  capi- 
tal,  and  time.  Many  other  real  assets  share  the 
quality  of  scarcity.  For  example,  the  stock  of  Rem- 
brandt’s  masterpieces  is  also  in  fixed  supply,  and 
each  painting  is  universally  deemed  to  be  an  excep- 
tional  store  of  value  relative  to  other  assets.  The 
critical  difference  between  gold  and  Rembrandt  paint- 
ings  as  stores  of  value  stems  from  the  relative  liquid- 
ity  of  these  assets.  Gold  is  a  homogeneous,  divisible, 
and  virtually  indestructable  asset;  Rembrandt  paint- 
ings  are  not.  The  difference  in  liquidity  means  that 
gold  is  readily  marketable  in  any  quantity.  The 
transactions  costs  involved  in  auctioning  Rembrandt 
paintings  are  considerable  by  comparison.  These 
distinctions  can  be  made  for  other  real  assets  com- 
pared  to  gold  as  well.  In  short,  few  other  real  assets 
possess  to  the  same  degree  the  properties  that  create 
gold’s  demand  as  a  store  of  value. 
(1)  Extreme  Political  and  Economic  Uncer- 
tainty.  Gold  is  a  unique  commodity  because 
throughout  history  it  has  been  considered  the  ulti- 
mate  store  of  value,  a  haven  for  the  preservation  of 
wealth,  particularly  in  times  of  turmoil.  Gold  has 
served  preeminently  as  a  store  of  value  for  many 
Times  of  economic  turmoil  and  political  upheaval 
tend  to  produce  a  demand  for  gold  to  safeguard 
wealth.  Gold  is  a  concentrated,  anonymous  asset. 
Wealth  held  in  the  form  of  gold  is  less  susceptible  to 
confiscation  by  governments  than  wealth  held  in 
other  forms.  Small  quantities  of  gold  generally  ex- 
change  for  large  physical  quantities  of  other  real 
assets.  Gold  is  therefore  highly  mobile  compared  to 
most  other  forms  of  wealth,  ideal  for  taking  flight 
across  national  boundaries.  Also,  wealth  may  be 
converted  from  gold  into  other  assets  without  divulg- 
ing  the  precious  metal’s  history  of  ownership. 
Chart  2 
Dollars  Per 
Troy Ounce 
THE  PRICE OF GOLD 
LONDON  P. M.  FIX 
(End  of  Month  Data) 
1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
Particularly  during  1979,  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic  unrest  that  has  beset  much  of  the  Middle  East 
and  neighboring  Asia  has  engendered  a  considerable 
demand  for  gold  as  a  store  of  value.  Newspaper 
accounts  of  activity  in  the  gold  market  routinely 
reported  the  market’s  speculation  that  the  Middle 
Eastern  demand  for  gold  was  the  driving  force  be- 
hind  the  upsurge  in  the  price  of  gold  in  late  1979  and 
early  1980.  But  before  the  international  turmoil  of 
1979,  other  factors  were  probably  more  important 
causes  of  gold  price  movements. 
(2)  Flow  Supply  and  Demand  for  Gold.  Evalu- 
ating  the  impact  of  flow  supply  and  demand  on  gold 
price  movements  requires  a  consideration  of  stock- 
flow  relationships.  On  the  one  hand,  the  demand  for 
gold  consists  of  the  derived  demands  for  gold  origi- 
nating  from  goods  fabricated  using  gold  and  of  the 
demand  for  gold  itself  as  an  asset.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  supply  of gold  consists  of  newly  mined  gold 
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from  stocks.  The  salient  characteristic  of  gold 
markets  is  that  changes  in  flows,  i.e.,  changes  in  the 
rate  of  commercial  demand  for  gold  or  in  gold’s  rate 
of  production,  affect  the  stock  of  gold  insignificantly 
compared  to  changes  in  rates  of  production  and  con- 
sumption  on  the  stocks  of  other  storable  commodities. 
For  this  reason  flow  supply  and  demand  for  gold 
have  a  relatively  small  impact  on  the  price  of  gold. 
Table  I  gives  a  rough  estimate  of  the  size  and 
composition  of  the  world  gold  stock  in  December 
1975.  Table  II  provides  world  gold  production  and 
consumption  data  since  1968.  Official  and  private 
holdings  of  gold  dwarf  the  magnitudes  of  gold  pro- 
duction  and  consumption  flows.  Official  stocks  are 
equivalent  to  approximately  30  years’  recent  annual 
worldwide  production,  while  readily  marketable 
private  stocks  amount  to  slightly  more  than  10 years’ 
annual  production. 
To  put  these  stock-flow  data  in  perspective,  con- 
sider  an  alternative  metal,  copper,  which  differs 
Table  I 
ESTIMATED WORLD  GOLD  STOCKS 
(millions  of  troy  ounces  with  metric  ton  equivalents) 
Estimated  Private  Gold  Stocks,  December  1975 
million  oz. 
Coins 
Private  bullion  holdings 
Industrial  inventories 
Total 





Official  Gold  Stocks,  IMF  and  Central  Banks  of 
Non-Communist  Countries,  December  1975 
1168 
Source:  Samuel  Montagu  &  Co.  [1]. 






Estimated  Quantity  of  Gold  in  Artwork  and  Jewelry 
1000  31104 
Source:  Wolfe  [13]. 
Table  II 
GOLD  FLOWS  1968-19781 
Components of  Supply 
Metric  Tons 
Non-Communist  world  mine  production 
Net  trade  with  Communist  bloc* 
Official  sales3 
Net  private  purchases 
Components of  Demand 
Metric  Tons 
Fabrication  categories: 
Carat  jewelry 
Electronics 
Dentistry 
Other  industrial/decorative  uses 
Medals,  medallions,  and  fake  coins 
Official  coins 
Total  fabrication  categories 
Net  private  bullion  purchases4 
Net  private  purchases 
912  904  1062  1060  996  512  220  519  931  996  1001 
82  100  89  86  105  127  92  67  76  77  85 
60  60  59  63  66  68  57  62  76  82  87 
58  63  62  69  71  72  67  60  66  67  75 
40  44  54  52  41  21  7  21  47  47  46 
68  26  46  54  63  54  287  244  184  137  259 
1221  1197  1372  1383  1341  854  729  973  1380  1405  1552 
615  -50  -337  3  -96  548  517  138  57  233  189 
1836  1147  1035  1386  1245  1402  1246  1111  1437  1638  1741 
1  For  the  non-Communist  world. 
2  Most  of  the  Communist  bloc  total  represents  sales  of  newly  mined  gold  by  the  Soviet  Union. 
3  Definition  of  official  soles  has  been  extended  from  1974  to  include  activities  of  government  controlled  investment  and  monetary  agencies 
in  addition  to  central  bank  operations.  This  category  also  includes  IMF  disposals. 
4This  category  excludes  coins,  but  includes  small  bar  hoarding  and  all  other  forms  of  bullion  investment. 
Source:  Consolidated  Gold  Fields  limited,  Gold 1979. 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 
1245  1252  1274  1236  1183  1121  1006  953  967  968  969 
-29  -15  -3  54  213  275  220  149  412  401  410 
620  -90  -236  96  -151  6  20  9  58  269  362 
1836  1147  1035  1386  1245  1402  1246  1111  1437  1638  1741 
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relationships.  As  a base  or  nonprecious  metal,  copper 
is  mined  in  huge  amounts  compared  to  gold  or  other 
precious  metals  and  has  wide-ranging  industrial  uses. 
Based  on  Bureau  of  Mines  data,  world  mine  produc- 
tion  of  gold  and  copper  in  1977  was  respectively 
1,212  and  7,687,000  metric  tons.  Commercial  stocks 
of  copper  in  the  United  States  amounted  to  522,000 
metric  tons  as  of  December  31,  1977,  increasing  4.9 
percent  over  the  previous  year.  In  1977,  industry 
used  2,050,000  metric  tons  ; U.  S.  refinery  production 
and  refined  imports  of  newly  mined  copper  came  to 
1,712,000  metric  tons.  (This  figure  does  not  include 
410,000  metric  tons  of  copper  recovered  from  scrap.) 
The  high  ratio  of  consumption  and  production  to 
stocks  on  hand  for  copper  gives  these  flows  the  po- 
tential  to  affect  the  price  dynamics  in  the  copper 
market  significantly. 
In  sharp  contrast  to  the  copper  market,  the  com- 
mercial  use  of  gold  is  a  relatively  unimportant  com- 
ponent  of  the  total  demand  for  this  precious  metal. 
Unfortunately,  statistics  on  gold  and  copper  stocks 
are  difficult  to  compare  because  only  data  relating  to 
commercial  stocks  are  reliable.  Statistics  relating  to 
private  noncommercial  stocks  are  largely  conjectural. 
According  to  the  estimates  in  Table  I,  commercial 
inventories  represent  only  5  percent  of  the  estimated 
private  world  gold  stocks  in  December  1975.  Bureau 
of  Mines  data  show  that  in  the  United  States  com- 
mercial  gold  stocks  constituted  59  percent  of year-end 
1977  gold  stocks.  The  remainder  consisted  predomi- 
nantly  of  gold  bullion.  This  statistic  for  the  U.  S. 
does  not  include  the  considerable  quantity  of  gold 
coins  held  privately. 
The  copper  price  might  behave  differently  from 
the  gold  price  owing  to  the  particular  stock-flow 
relationships  in  the  two  markets.  Because  of  the 
relatively  great  quantities  of  copper  held  in  storage, 
marginal  outlay  costs  are  probably  substantial  for 
firms  using  copper  as  an  input  to  production.  To 
minimize  costs,  therefore,  industries  probably  draw 
more  copper  from  current  copper  production  than 
from  copper  stocks.  Firms  store  copper  primarily 
to  have  stocks  on  hand  to  maintain  a  smooth 
flow  of  production  of  goods  fabricated  with  copper. 
These  commercial  stocks  provide  a  convenience  yield 
to  the  firm  for  the  reasons  discussed  in  the  preceding 
section.  It  should  be  noted,  of  course,  that  a  small 
fraction  of  gold  stocks  is  held  for  its  convenience 
yield  analogously  to  copper  stocks.  However,  most 
gold  stocks  may  be  termed  speculative  stocks,  i.e., 
stocks  for  which  the  primary  motivation  for  owner- 
ship  rests  on  an  anticipation  of  capital  gain.  Because 
of  the  great  industrial  demand  for  copper,  however, 
commercial  stocks  are  likely  to  be  of  far  greater 
magnitude  than  purely  speculative  copper  stocks. 
The  greater  relative  magnitude  of  flows  to  stocks 
and  the  greater  price  sensitivity  of  flow  supply  and 
demand  to  the  current  price  for  copper  compared  to 
gold  could  potentially  make  for  differences  in  the 
price  dynamics  of  these  two  metals.  For  example, 
events  temporarily  affecting  production  (such  as  a 
strike)  or  consumption  (such  as  a  recession)  are 
more  likely  to  affect  the  price  of  copper  than  gold. 
As  another  example,  a  speculatively  induced  fall  in 
the  spot  price  would  be  more  likely  to  reduce  current 
production  and  increase  current  consumption  for 
copper  than  gold.  The  greater  production  and  con- 
sumption  effect  could  tend  to  offset  the  initial  spot 
price  fall  and  prolong  the  price  adjustment  to  antici- 
pated  future  disturbances. 
(3)  Inflation.  The  following  provides  an  analy- 
sis  of  the  effects  of  a  fully  anticipated  inflation  on 
the  path  of  the  gold  price.  Suppose  there  occurs  an 
increase  in  the  government  budget  deficit.  Further- 
more,  suppose  it  to  be  financed  largely  with  money 
creation  so  that  the  public  comes  to  expect  an  increase 
in  the  long-run  rate  of  money  growth  and  an  associ- 
ated  increase  in  the  long-run  rate  of  inflation.  What 
happens  to  the  price  of  gold  ? 
Because  this  is  a  fully  anticipated  increase  in  the 
rate  of  inflation,  an  inflationary  premium  is  incor- 
porated  into  the  nominal  rate  of  interest.  For  ex- 
ample,  if  anticipated  inflation  rises  by  5  percentage 
points,  the  nominal  rate  of  interest  will  rise  by  the 
same  amount.  This  means,  first  of  all,  that  the  new 
long-run  equilibrium  rate  of  gold  price appreciation 
will  be  higher  by  5  percentage  points.  In  other 
words,  in  the  new  long-run  equilibrium  the  gold 
price  will  rise  at  the  new,  higher  general  rate  of 
inflation. 
Figure  2  illustrates  these  changes  in  the  path  of 
the  gold  price.  The  change  in  the  rate  of  money 
growth  and  inflation  occurs  at  time  t.  For  reasons 
outlined  above,  the  tilt  of  the  gold  price  path  is 
greater  after  time  t.  But  the  whole  “level”  of  the 
price  path  is  shown  to  shift  up  at  time  t  as  well. 
Why  should  this  be  the  case? 
The  dollar  price  of  gold  is  the  relative  price  of 
gold  in  terms  of  dollars.  The  relative  price  depends 
on  the  demand  for  gold  relative  to  dollars,  which  in 
turn  depends  on  the  relative  anticipated  rate  of return 
on  gold  versus  dollars.  Inflation  and  the  increased 
anticipated  capital  gain  on  gold  increases  the  return 
on  gold  relative  to  money.  It  is  the  one  time  perma- 
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nent  increase  in  the  demand  for  gold  relative  to 
money  associated  with  anticipated  inflation  that  leads 
the  entire  price  path  to  shift  up  at  time  t.  This  rela- 
tive  rate  of  return  effect  is  partly  responsible  for  the 
sensitivity  of  the  spot  price  of  gold  to  a  change  in 
anticipated  inflation.7  In  the  foregoing  example, 
anticipated  inflation  rises  by  5  percentage  points. 
However,  if  the  sensitivity  of  demand  for  gold  rela- 
tive  to  money  with  respect  to  a  change  in  the  antici- 
pated  rate  of  price  appreciation  is  high,  the  jump  in 
the  gold  price  at  time  t  could  greatly  exceed  5  per- 
centage  points. 
(4)  Government  Auction  Policy.  Official  gold 
stocks  of  the  non-Communist  world’s  central  banks 
and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
amounted  to  35,382  metric  tons  as  of  September  30, 
1978.  These  stocks  constitute  roughly  half  of  the 
world’s  gold  stock  and  therefore  have  the  potential  to 
influence  the  gold  price  significantly  if  supplied  to 
gold  markets  in  sizable  quantities.  Particularly  in 
the  late  1970’s,  as  seen  in  Table  II,  these  official 
stocks  of  gold  have  contributed  substantially  to  sup- 
plies  of  gold  on  world  markets. 
The  International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  United 
States  Treasury  have  been  principal  sellers  of  gold 
through  their  auctions  during  this  period.  In  Janu- 
ary  1976,  the  IMF  announced  that  it  would  sell 
one-sixth  of  its  gold  stocks  via  monthly  auctions. 
The  U.  S.  Treasury  announced  in  December  1974 
that  it  would  conduct  gold  auctions.  Two  Treasury 
auctions  occurred  in  1975.  Partly  to  support  the 
7The  price  of  gold  is  also  likely  to  be  more  sensitive  to 
changes  in  anticipated  inflation  than  prices  of  other 
storable  commodities.  Gold  is  more  liquid  than  other 
storable  commodities  since  the  transactions  costs  of 
bringing  buyer  and  seller  together  tend  to  be  less.  There- 
fore,  in  response  to  a  change  in  anticipated  inflation, 
anticipated  net  revenue  from  storage  can  be  maximized 
more  readily  for  gold  than  for  other  commodities. 
exchange  value  of  the  dollar  in  1978,  the  Treasury 
decided  to  hold  regular  monthly  auctions  commencing 
in  May  1978.  Both  the  Treasury  and  IMF  auction 
series  continue  to  the  present  day.8  What  are  the 
probable  effects  of  auctions  on  the  price  of  gold? 
An  analysis  of  the  probable  effects  of  official  auc- 
tions  on  the  gold  price  based  on  the  model  of  gold 
price  movements  is  given  in  general  terms  in  the 
following  example.  After  an  announcement  by  the 
U.  S.  Treasury  of  a gold  auction,  including  the  quan- 
tity  to  be  auctioned  and  the  time  of  the  auction,  the 
actual  auction  would  have  little  effect  on  the  gold 
price  when  it  occurs  if  the  market  anticipates  the 
auction.  The  market  price  would  fall  in  reaction  to 
the  initial  announcement,  entirely  discounting  the 
effects  of  the  auction  before  it  takes  place. 
Obviously,  the  gold  market  does  not  predict  the 
effects  of  such  an  auction  perfectly;  the  market  price 
changes  as  forecasts  are  revised.  For  example,  if 
the  demand  at  a  given  price  has  been  underestimated 
at  the  time  of  the  auction,  the  price  will  rise  to  clear 
the  market. 
III. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
This  section  presents  empirical  evidence  in  support 
of  the  model  of  gold  price  movements  set  forth  in 
Section  I.  That  simple  model  is  based  on  the  as- 
sumption  that  participants  in  the  gold  market  are 
rational  and  act  in  their  self-interest.  The  aggregate 
effect  of  their  actions  produces  a  particular  path  of 
the  gold  price.  It  is  assumed  that  these  market  par- 
ticipants  continually  assess  new  information  about 
the  gold  market  and  all  the  political  and  economic 
events  that  impinge  on  the  supply  and  demand  for 
gold.  This  view  of  the  market  implies  that  the 
apparently  erratic  short-run  changes  in  the  price  of 
gold  register  the  market’s  perception  of  changing 
economic  events.  Some  important  questions  arise 
in  this  context.  How  quickly  does  the  market  re- 
spond  to  new  information?  Does  the  price  of  gold 
reflect  available  information  at  a  given  time,  or  does 
it  take  time  for  new  information  to  affect  the  market 
price? 
8On  October  16,  1979,  the  Treasury  changed  its  gold 
auction  policy  in  a  move  officially  designed  to  “deter 
speculation.”  Further  auctions  would  be  announced  only 
several  days  in  advance,  at  which  time  at  least  the  mini- 
mum  amount  of  gold  to  be  auctioned  would  be  disclosed. 
See  Wall Street  Journal,  17  October  1979,  p.  4.  One 
auction  on  November  1,  1979  has  been  undertaken  by  the 
Treasury  under  this  new  policy.  See  Henderson  and 
Salant  [12]  for  an  account  of  the  effects  of  this  kind  of 
policy  on  the  price of  gold.  The  last  scheduled  IMF 
auction  will  be  in  May  1980. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  9 The  economic  theory  of  gold  price  movements 
implies  that  available  information  about  the  future 
price  of  gold  is  rapidly  discounted  into  the  current 
spot  price.  According  to  this  theory,  to  the  extent 
that  stocks  are  sufficiently  large  relative  to  flows, 
successive  price  changes  tend  to  be  uncorrelated. 
Additionally,  futures  prices  should  be  unbiased  fore- 
casts  of  future  spot  prices.  In  other  words,  errors  in 
forecasting  future  spot  prices  should  arise  from  un- 
predictable  influences  on  future  spot  prices,  not  from 
systematic  biases  in  predicting  these  prices.  Forecast 
errors  therefore  should  be  uncorrelated  and  have 
zero  mean. 
Regression  analysis  is  used  to  empirically  evaluate 
the  gold  market’s  response  to  new  information.  The 
following  regression  estimates  the  amount  of  current 
price  movement  that  can  be  explained  (1)  by  past 
price  movements  and  (2)  by  the  level  of  a  current 
interest  rate.  Price  movements  are  expressed  as 
monthly  percentage  changes,  e.g., 
D 1nPt  ” 1nPt-1nPt-1 
The  percentage  change  in  the  gold  price  in  the  cur- 
rent  period,  D lnPt,  is  regressed  on  the  percentage 
change  in  the  gold  price  in  preceding  monthly  peri- 
ods,  D  lnPt-1  and  D  lnPt-2,  and  the  yield  on  a  se- 
curity  of  one-month  maturity,  rt.  The  regression 
equation  is  specified  as  follows: 
(3)  D lnPt= a + b  1rt+  b 2  D lnPt-1+ 
b 1nPt-2+ut. 
The  disturbance  term  ut  captures  any  movements  in 
the  current  price  not  explained  by  the  included  lagged 
percentage  price  change  variables  or  by  the  interest 
rate. 
The  data  consist  of  first-of-month  gold  prices  as 
quoted  at  the  P.M.  Fixing  of  the  London  Gold 
Market  and  first-of-month  Treasury  bill’ yields  (on  a 
discount  basis)  of  one-month  maturity.  These  data 
span  a  period  from  January  1973  to  December  1979, 
although  after  differencing  and  lagging  the  variables, 
the  sample  period  runs  from  April  1973  to  December 
1979,  containing  81  observations. 
Equation  3  was  estimated  as  follows: 
D  1nPt=-.028+.678rt+.056  D lnPt-1+.043  D 1nPt-2 
(.035)  (.519)  (.111)  (.113) 
R2=.039  SEE=.077  SSR=.461  DW=1.999 
9 Because  this  regression  includes  lagged  dependent  vari- 
ables,  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic  is  biased  toward  2  if 
there  is  no  first  order  serial  correlation  in  the  residuals. 
As  indicated  by  the  R2,  this  regression  explains  only 
3.9  percent  of  the  variation  in  the  percentage  change 
in  the  current  gold  price.  The  coefficients  on  the 
lagged  percentage  price  changes  are  both  insignifi- 
cantly  different  from  zero.  (The  standard  errors 
appear  in  parentheses.)  Current  percentage  price 
changes  therefore  appear  to  be  statistically  independ- 
ent  of  percentage  price  changes  in  preceding  months. 
In  addition,  the  coefficient  on  the  interest  rate  is 
significant  at  a  90  percent  level  of  confidence,  and 
the  constant  is  insignificantly  different  from  zero. 
This  test  of  statistical  independence  of  price 
changes  has  a  straightforward  interpretation  in  terms 
of  the  model  of  gold  price  movements.  The  test 
results  support  the  contention  that  market  partici- 
pants  respond  quickly,  i.e.,  within  a  month,  to  new 
information.  According  to  the  empirical  results,  no 
further  market  price  adjustment  to  that  information 
occurs  in  the  following  month. 
The  interest  rate  coefficient  also  has  an  interesting 
interpretation.  The  model  of  gold  price  movements 
includes  several  assumptions  about  the  components 
of  net  marginal  storage  costs.  In  particular,  it  was 
argued  above  that  marginal  outlay  and  convenience 
yield  are  negligible  compared  to  marginal  interest 
costs  for  gold.  If  this  is  in  fact  the  case,  other  things 
held  constant,  a  rise  in  the  interest  rate  should  cause 
an  equiproportionate  increase  in  the  current  per- 
centage  change  in  the  gold  price,  i.e.,  the  coefficient 
on  the  interest  rate  should  differ  insignificantly  from 
unity. 
The  interest  rate  coefficient  in  the  regression  has 
an  estimated  value  of  .678,  which  is  insignificantly 
different  from  unity  and  significantly  different  from 
zero  at  a  90  percent  level  of  confidence  under  the 
appropriate  one-tailed  test.  Even  though  the  regres- 
sion  explains  only  a  small  amount  of  the  variation 
in  the  current  percentage  price  change,  the  interest 
rate  is  significantly  correlated  with  the  contemporan- 
eous  gold  price  change. 
Viewed  in  isolation,  the  relatively  weak  signifi- 
cance  of  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the  interest  rate 
does  not  seem  to  shed  much  light  on  price  move- 
ments.  Is  it  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  other 
marginal  storage  costs  are  negligible?  A  comparison 
of  gold  price  movements  with  copper  price  move- 
ments  can  highlight  several  points  about  net  marginal 
storage  costs. 
In  particular,  components  of  net  marginal  storage 
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portant  for  copper.  In  the  copper  market,  marginal 
outlay  costs,  especially  for  warehousing,  may  be  an 
increasing  function  of  copper  stocks,  and  marginal 
convenience  yield  may  be  a  positive,  decreasing  func- 
tion  of  these  stocks.  Furthermore,  net  marginal 
storage  costs  are  likely  to  be  sensitive  to  changes  in 
the  physical  volume  of  copper  stocks  held. 
For  example,  an  increase  in  the  interest  rate  raises 
net  marginal  storage  costs.  If  anticipations  of  future 
copper  prices  are  unchanged,  the  current  copper  price 
would  fall  as  holders  of  copper  attempt  to  reduce 
their  stocks  in  response  to  higher  net  marginal  stor- 
age  costs.  The  lower  copper  price  would  tend  to 
reduce  current  production  and  increase  current  con- 
sumption,  thereby  reducing  physical  stocks.  Conse- 
quently,  net  marginal  storage  costs  would  diminish 
because  the  marginal  convenience  yield  would  rise 
and  marginal  outlay  costs  would  fall. 
To  evaluate  the  importance  of  an  interest  rate  in 
explaining  copper  price  movements,  a  copper  price 
regression  similar  to  the  gold  price  regression  is  esti- 
mated.  Since  changes  in  marginal  outlay  and  con- 
venience  yield  are  more  likely  to  offset  changes  in  the 
interest  rate  for  copper  than  gold,  the  interest  rate 
coefficient  should  come  in  less  significantly  different 
from  zero  in  the  copper  price  regression  than  in  the 
gold  price  regression. 
The  sample  period  is  the  same  as  the  period  for 
the  gold  price  series,  and  the  data  consist  of  first-of- 
month  noon  spot  wirebar  prices  as  quoted  on  the 
London  Metal  Exchange.  The  specification  of  the 
regression  is  the  same  as  Equation  3. 
The  copper  price  equation  was  estimated  as 
follows  : 
D 1nPt=.002+.046rt+.187  D lnPt-1-.054  D lnPt-2 
(.042)  (.606)  (.114)  (.115) 
R2=.035  SEE=.095  SSR=.699  DW=1.96 
The  coefficient  on  the  interest  rate  is  insignificantly 
different  from  zero  and  significantly  different  from 
unity.  The  t-statistic  for  the  interest  rate  is  .0756, 
which  indicates  far  less  statistical  significance  than 
the  t-statistic  (1.307)  for  the  interest  rate  in  the  gold 
price  regression.  The  considerably  greater  signifi- 
cance  of  the  interest  rate  coefficient  in  the  gold  price 
regression  as  compared  to  the  copper  price  regression 
supports  the  theoretical  differences  advanced  above 
about  the  composition  of  net  marginal  storage  costs 
for  these  metals.10 
The  copper  price  regression  also  reveals  that 
copper  price  changes  are  serially  uncorrelated  at  a 
95  percent  level  of  confidence.  However,  evidence 
that  price  changes  are  serially  uncorrelated  is  less 
clear  in  the  copper  price  regression  than  in  the  gold 
price  regression.  The  suggested  potential  importance 
of  flow  supply  and  demand  responses  to  copper  price 
movements  discussed  in  Section  III  appears  to  be 
weakly  discernible,  since  copper  price  changes  are 
serially  correlated  at  a  90  percent  level  of  confidence. 
As  an  additional  test,  the  gold  market’s  response  to 
new  information  is  examined  in  the  relationship  be- 
tween  futures  prices  and  future  spot  prices.  If  the 
market  absorbs  new  information  rapidly,  futures 
prices  should  be  unbiased  forecasts  of  future  spot 
prices.  In  the  particular  test  constructed,  the  loga- 
rithm  of  the  spot  price  on  the  first  trading  day  of  the 
delivery  month  is  regressed  on  the  logarithm  of  the 
futures  price  on  the  first  trading  day  three  months 
earlier.  The  estimated  equation  is: 
(4)  1nS t= a  +  b  lnFt-3+ut, 
where  St  is  the  spot  price,  Ft-3  is  the  futures  price 
for  the  same  contract  lagged  three  months,  and  ut 
is  a  random  disturbance  term.11 
These  data  include  the  relevant  spot  and  futures 
prices  on  contracts  that  have  traded  on  the  Chicago 
Mercantile  Exchange’s  International  Monetary  Mar- 
ket.  New  delivery  months  occur  in  March,  June, 
September,  and  December  of  each  year.  Running 
from  the  September  1975  through  the  December  1979 
futures  contracts,  the  sample  consists  of  18  observa- 
tions.  The  sample  is  small.  Nonetheless,  these  data 
permit  a  useful  test  of  the  gold  market’s  ability  to 
assimilate  new  information. 
10 There  is  a  statistical  problem  with  the  copper  price 
series  that  could  bias  the  interest  rate  coefficient  down- 
ward  and  reduce  its  t-statistic.  The  copper  price  is 
quoted  in  pounds  sterling  and  was  converted  to  dollars 
using  a  first-of-month  exchange  rate  series  derived  from 
the  Federal  Reserve’s  dollar/pound  daily  certified  noon 
buying  rates  for  cable  transfers  in  New  York  City.  The 
pound  sterling  copper  price  series  and  the  exchange  rate 
series  are  not  contemporaneous,  but  differ  by  six  hours. 
It  is  doubtful  that  this  statistical  problem  alone  could 
account  for  the  great  disparity  in  statistical  significance 
of  the  interest  rate  coefficient  in  the  gold  and  copper 
price  regressions.  One  way to  avoid  the  problem  would 
be  to  use  a  British  Treasury  bill  yield  series.  but  such  a 
series  was  not  available  to-the  author. 
11 The  logarithmic  transformation  is  used  because  it  is 
the  proportionate  difference  between  these  variables  that 
matters,  not  the  absolute  difference. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  11 If  futures  prices  are  unbiased  predictors  of  future 
spot  prices,  the  constant  in  this  regression  should 
differ  insignificantly  from  zero  and  the  coefficient 
on  the  futures  price  should  differ  insignificantly  from 
unity.12  Such  estimates  would  be  consistent  with  the 
view  that  a  one  percent  increase  or  decrease  in  today’s 
futures  price  would  result  in  a  one  percent  change  in 
the  spot  price  in  the  same  direction  three  months 
later.13  Equation  4  was  estimated  as  follows: 
InSt=  -0.815+1.166  lnFt-3 
(.520) (.101) 
If  futures  price  Ft-3  reflects  all  available  information 
at  t-3,  including  prices  one  month  earlier,  the  esti- 
mated  coefficient  b  2  on  the  new  explanatory  variable 
should  be  insignificantly  different  from  zero.  In 
addition,  the  amount  of  variation  in  the  dependent 
variable  St  explained  by  this  regression,  measured 
by  the  regression’s  R2,  should  remain  relatively  un- 
changed.  Equation  5  was  estimated  as  follows: 
lnSt=-0.929+1.0001nFt-3+.1901nFt-4 
(.603)  (.424)  (.466) 
R2=.894  SEE=.128  SSR=.244  DW=2.07 
R2=.893  SEE=.12414  SSR=.247  DW=2.23 
At  a  95  percent  confidence  level,  the  constant  is 
insignificantly  different  from  zero  and  the  coefficient 
on  the  futures  price  variable  is  insignificantly  differ- 
ent  from  unity.  15  The  Durbin-Watson  statistic  indi- 
cates  no  first-order  serial  correlation  in  the  residuals, 
i.e.,  forecast  errors  are  uncorrelated.16 
As  an  additional  test,  the  futures  price  one  month 
earlier,  Ft-4,  was  added  as  a  second  explanatory 
variable  : 
(5)  1nS t= a + b  llnFt-3+  b 21nFt-4+ut. 
12 A  further  test  of  the  independence  of  forecast  errors 
involves  a  direct  measure  of  serial  correlation  in  these 
errors.  The  parameters  a  and b  in  regression  4 are  con- 
strained  to  equal  0  and  1 respectively,  and  the  logarithm 
of  the  futures  price  is  subtracted  from  the  logarithm 
of  the  spot  price  to  give  a  series  of  percentage  forecast 
errors,  FE.  This  procedure  of  constraining  the  coeffi- 
cients  in  effect  makes  the  assumption  that  forecast  errors 
are  indeed  independent.  An  autoregression  of  these 
forecast  errors  directly  tests  the  hypothesis  that  these 
errors  are  uncorrelated.  The  autoregression  follows: 
FEt=.051-.024FEt-1+.304FEt-2 
(.034)  (.283)  (.280) 
R2=.085  SEE=.129  SSR=.217  DW=2.06 
The  hypothesis  that  forecast  errors  are  uncorrelated  and 
have  zero  mean  cannot  be  rejected  at  a  95  percent  level 
of  confidence. 
13 Note  that  by  the  delivery  month  the  spot  price  may 
diverge  from  its  futures  price  forecast  as  the  market 
responds  to  new  information  received  in  the  intervening 
period. 
14 Note  that  in  this  regression  the  standard  error  of 
estimate  (SEE)  multiplied  by  100  is  the  average  per- 
centage  forecast  error  over  the  sample  period. 
15 The  joint  restriction  that  a =  0  and b  =  1 could  not  be 
rejected  at  a  90  percent  level  of  confidence  using  the 
appropriate  chi-square  test  with  2  degrees  of  freedom. 
16 Estimated  residual  autocorrelations  at  lags  1  and  2 
were  insignificantly  different  from  zero  at  a  95  percent 
level  of  confidence. 
The  inclusion  of  the  second  futures  price  does  not’ 
increase  the  explanatory  power  of  this  regression  and 
the  new  variable’s  coefficient  differs  insignificantly 
from  zero  at  a  95  percent  level.  Though  admittedly 
not  very  powerful  because  of  the  small  sample  size, 
this  further  test  of  the  gold  market’s  response  to  new 
information  provides  additional  statistical  evidence 
to  support  the  basic  model  of  gold  price  movements. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Financial  writers  cite  a variety  of factors  that  influ- 
ence  gold  price  movements.  These  writers  typically 
view  the  price  of gold  as  a  barometer  of  economic  and 
political  instability.  Left  unexplained,  however,  is 
the  mechanism  determining  gold  price  movements 
that  leads  these  prices  to  foreshadow  changes  in  the 
rate  of  inflation,  the  stability  of  governments,  official 
gold  auction  policy,  etc.  This  article  has  explained 
the  economics  that  underlies  movements  in  the  price 
of  gold. 
As  argued  above,  gold  differs  only  in  degree  from 
other  storable  commodities  in  the  way  various  eco- 
nomic  factors  influence  its  price.  The  spot  prices 
of  all  storable  commodities,  including  gold,  are  par- 
ticularly  influenced  by  anticipations  of  future  spot 
prices.  In  the  case  of  gold,  however,  the  relative 
insignificance  of  flow  supply  and  demand  compared 
to  stocks,  the  relative  insensitivity  of  flow  supply  and 
demand  with  respect  to  spot  price  movements,  and 
the  relative  liquidity  of  gold  all  tend  to  make  current 
changes  in  the  gold  price  especially  sensitive  to 
changes  in  its  anticipated  future  spot  price. 
The  episodic  run  ups  and  run  downs  in  the  price 
of gold  associated  with  periods  of  economic  and  social 
turmoil  have  fascinated  and  frequently  bewildered 
observers  of the  gold  market.  At  such  times,  analysts 
often  conclude  that  mob  psychology  overwhelms  the 
12  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MARCH/APRIL  1980 market  as  market  participants  lose  sight  of  so-called  chology  are  unnecessary  to  explain  the  behavior  of 
market  fundamentals.  However,  the  theory  and  em-  the  gold  price.  In  other  words,  economic  theory 
pirical  evaluation  of  gold  price  movements  presented  appears  sufficient  to  account  for  gold  price  move- 
here  demonstrate  that  ad  hoc  appeals  to  mob  psy-  ments  in  recent  years. 
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